In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackelberg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers' best response functions is equal to zero in equilibrium.
Introduction
The Cournot-Walras equilibrium (CWE) models opened by Gabszewicz and Vial [1] , and developed in exchange economies by Codognato and Gabszewicz [2, 3] , Gabszewicz and Michel [4] and Busetto, Codognato and Ghosal [5, 6] feature the consequences of strategic interactions in general equilibrium. The strategic traders manipulate the equilibrium relative prices by restricting their supplies on the markets. Some contributions aim at comparing the CWE with other strategic equilibria. Codognato [7] studies the equivalence between the CWE and the Cournot equilibrium, while Codognato [8] compares two Cournot-Nash equilibrium models. In this note, we compare the CWE and the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium (SWE) defined in Julien and Tricou [9] . From the benchmark of Cournot-Walras exchange economies, the SWE concept inserts Stackelberg competition into interrelated markets. We determine the conditions under which the CWE and the SWE are equivalent.
We thus consider a mixed market exchange economy as developed in Shitovitz [10] and Codognato [7] . Therefore, strategic interactions prevail here in one sector only. We characterize and define the SWE in this framework. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the SWE and the CWE can coincide only if 1) the atoms have the same endowments and preferences and 2) the elasticity of the best response functions is zero. So, in mixed markets exchange economies, the SWE and the CWE coincide when two kinds of conditions are satisfied: one stems from the fundamentals, another is based on consistent expectations formed by the atomic part of the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a characterization and a definition of the SWE in a mixed-markets exchange economy. Section 3 is devoted to the statement and the proof of the proposition. In Section 4, an example is given. In Section 5, we conclude.
The Stackelberg-Walras Equilibrium
The space of commodites is  . There is a finite set of divisible commodities, indexed by . Let 
T T 
An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an integrable function   t x from T to  . All integrals are with respect to t. Any trader has a measurable, continuous, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave .,
. For all , is an assignment. Given a strategy profile s , the equilibrium price system is the solution to:
We assume that   , p s ω exists and is unique. We here follow the argument developed by Codognato and Gabszewicz [3] 
., is an allocation.
In the second step, the followers determine their best response functions. The strategic plan   2 s t of any follower solves:
The solution to this program yields the best response function 
The system of equations given by (9) 
.
The solution to this program yields the best response function denoted by     
In the symmetric equilibrium (8) 
bodies a non co -Walras equilibriu operative equilibrium of a game where the players are the atoms, the strategies are their supply decisions and the payoffs are their utility levels.
DEFINITION (SWE). A Stacke
We first determine the SWE. The competitive step is determined before the strategic steps. Given a price vector , trader p
m is given by a vector of strategy profiles   ;ω , for all
3)
It leads to
. Given   p p , the program of any trader i may be written:
s.t. = , = 1, , . . We make the following assumptions:
In the first strategic step, follower i, = 1, , i m n   , determines his best response function, which is the solution to: 
At the symmetric SWE, one has     e traders ta their r s optimizing, and thus behave as if they played a simultaneous move gam r rivals behave following a Cournotian reaction function. This condition on consistent conjectures is necessary but not sufficient. It may also hold when both equilibria do not coincide. In addition, the shape of the reaction functions and their slopes at equilibrium depend notably on the market demand function. The CobbDouglas specification leads to an isoelastic aggregate market demand function. Thus, the market demand which addresses to the atoms has a constant unitary price elasticity. So, when all atoms have the same endowments and preferences, their market shares are equal, which implies that their (Cournotian) equilibrium strategies are identical. If strategic traders did not have the same endowments and preferences, their equilibrium strategies would differ and could not correspond to the Cournotian ones (the same result can hold in industrial organization when firms have not the same marginal costs). Therefore, we extend a result obtained in partial equilibrium by Julien [11] to cover exchange economies.
An Example
Consider the case for which = 2  . The price system is   
